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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: INCENTIVES FOR LEARNING
by John Bishop, Cornell Univ.
Research Findings: In math and science the gap between Japanese, Canadian, English
and Finnish high school graduates and white American high school graduates is more than
twice the size of the 2 to 3 grade level equivalent gap between blacks and whites in the US.
American high school students do poorly in these comparisons primarily because they
devote a lot less time and energy to the task of learning. Parents are apathetic as well.
Even though American children learn substantially less in school, American parents are more
satisfied with the performance of their local schools than parents in Japan and Taiwan.
In Canada, Australia, Japan and Europe, students study harder and parents demand more
of their schools because labor market success is determined by how much is learned in high
school. National or provincial examinations assessing grasp of the high school curriculum
determine admission to university and into programs preparing for high paying careers. Grades
on these exams appear on one's resume for decades. Large firms in Japan and Europe hire
many entry level workers directly out of high school and base their selections on grades and
exam scores.
In the US, by contrast, credentials signifying time spent in school are well rewarded
but most students realize few benefits from studying hard while in school. This is a
consequence of four phenomena:
* The labor market fails to adequately reward effort and achievement in high
school. Even though achievement in math, science and English has large effects
on job performance in clerical, technical, service and blue collar jobs, analysis
of NLS Youth data demonstrates that during the first 8 years after high school
graduation these competencies have no effect on the wage rates and earnings
of young men. For young women, mathematical reasoning has a positive effect
on wage rates but the effect is significantly smaller than the productivity effects
of this competency. Many high schools do not send high school transcripts to
employers when ex students request them to.
* Admission to selective colleges is not based on an absolute or external standard
of achievement in high school subjects. It is based instead on aptitude tests
which do not assess the high school curriculum and on such measures of student
performance as class rank and grade point averages, which are defined relative
to classmates' performances not relative to an external standard in the way scout
merit badges or the English '0' level exams are. AS A RESULT:
* The peer group actively discourages academic effort because studying hard shifts
the grading curve up and makes it harder for classmates.
* Parents do not demand higher standards because this will not improve their
child's GPA, rank in class or SAT score and it would put at risk what is really
important--the diploma.
Policy Recommendations: The key to motivation is recognizing and rewarding learning
effort and achievement. Learning accomplishments need to be described on an absolute scale
(so that improvements in the quality and rigor of the teaching and greater effort by all
students makes everybody better off) and signaled to employers. The following specific
reforms are recommended:
* Institute statewide achievement exams which require essays and other extended
answers (similar to NY's Regents Exams) and base college admissions decisions and
merit scholarships on the results.
Establish new graduation credentials ("Career Passport", "Competency Profile") which
signal the student's learning accomplishments (measured by a criterion referenced scale)
to the labor market.
Expand the Advanced Placement Program by arranging for a large number of
selective colleges to "strongly recommend" that applicants take and pass AP exams in
both their junior and senior year and by awarding $100. AP Excellence Awards to
students who pass the exams and funding summer training institutes for the AP
*
*
*
teachers.
Replace the SAT exam. Using scores on AP exams and state achievement exams to
make college admission decisions will generate incentives to study and to upgrade
one's local school.
* After 40 years it is time to modernize the cognitive content of the GATB by adding
subtests measuring algebra, geometry, technical and scientific knowledge. This
increases validity and strengthens incentives to study.
Employers should be encouraged to use high school grades and broad spectrum
achievement tests like the ASVAB for hiring selections.
All applicants for civil service jobs should be required to submit high school and
college transcripts.
Base Selection into the armed forces on competence in science and technical
subjects not just English and math.
Keep schools operating until 5 PM and all summer offering enrichment programs
to all students.
*
*
*
*
* Require students who are lagging behind to attend remedial programs after school
and during the summer.
Institute Cooperative Learning. Classroom recognition of team performance results
in students urging other team members to study hard.
*
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The scientific and mathematical competence of American high school students is
generally recognized to be very low. The National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) reports that only 7.5 percent of 17 year old students can "integrate specialized
scientific information" (NAEP 1988a p.51) and 6.4 percent "demonstrated the capacity to
apply mathematical operations in a variety of problem settings." (NAEP 1988b p. 42)
There is a large gap between the science and math competence of young Americans
and their counterparts overseas. In the 1960s, the low ranking of American high school
students in such comparisons was attributed to the fact that the test was administered to a
larger proportion of American than European and Japanese youth. This is no longer the
case. Figures 1 to 4 plot the scores in Algebra, Biology, Chemistry and Physics against
proportion of the 18-year old population in the types of courses to which the international
test was administered. In the Second International Math Study, the universe from which
the American sample was drawn consisted of high school seniors taking a college
preparatory math course. This group represents 13 percent of the age cohort, a proportion
that is roughly comparable to the 12 percent of Japanese youth who were in their sample
frame and is considerably smaller than the 19 percent of youth in the Canadian province of
Ontario and the 50 percent of Hungarians who took the test. In Algebra, the mean score
for this very select group of American students was about equal to the mean score of the
much larger group of Hungarians and substantially below the Canadian achievement level
(McKnight et al 1987).
The findings of the Second International Science Study are even more dismal. For
example, the 25 % of Canadian 18-year olds taking chemistry know just as much
chemistry as the very select 1 % of Americans high school seniors taking their second
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chemistry course (most of whom are in "Advanced Placement"). The 28 % taking biology
know much more than the 6 % of American 17-18 year olds who are taking their second
biology course (International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement,
1988).
(Figure 1-4 about here)
The poor performance of American students is sometimes blamed on the nation's
"diversity". Many affluent parents apparently believe that their children are doing
acceptably by international standards. This is not the case. In Stevenson, Lee and
Stigler's (1986) study of 5th grade math achievement, the best of the 20 classrooms
sampled in Minneapolis was outstripped by every single classroom studied in Sendai, Japan
and by 19 of the 20 classrooms studied in Taipeh, Taiwan. The nation's top high school
students rank far behind much less elite samples of students in other countries. In math
and science the gap between Japanese high school students and their white American
counterparts is more than twice the size of the two to three grade level equivalent gap
between blacks and whites in the US. The learning deficit is pervasive.
The costs in terms of competitiveness and living standards of these educational
deficits is very large. Bishop (1989) applied a growth accounting methodology to a related
issue--the cost of the test score decline--and using conservative assumptions calculated the
resulting reduction in GNP to be $86 billion in 1987 projected in real terms to double by
the year 2000. The test score decline between 1967 and 1980 was only 1.25 grade level
equivalents on average across all academic subjects; the deficit with respect to Japan in
math and science (the only two subjects for which there are recent international
comparisons) is more than 4 US grade level equivalents at the end of high school.
Analysis of the NLS Youth Cohort data on wages and earnings and GATB revalidation
data and military data on the association between tests and job performance has found that
mathematical competencies are better predictors of job performance and wages than verbal
competencies in the great bulk of blue collar and clerical jobs (Bishop 1987b, 1988b). If
this is the case and the deficit is not substantially made up in college, extrapolations from
the test score decline study would imply that the educational deficit could on its own
produce a productivity differential between Japan and the United States of more than 10
percent. (At the exchange rate prevailing in February 1989, Japanese manufacturing workers
2
are paid roughly -- percent more than American manufacturing workers.)
This paper examines the causes of this learning deficit and then recommends policy
measures for remedying the problems identified. Section 1 presents evidence that
American students devote considerably less time and energy to learning in high school than
their counterparts abroad.
Section 2 attributes the differences in learning effort to differences across societies
in the structure and magnitude of the rewards for academic achievement. It is
demonstrated that the US labor market under rewards learning achievements in high school
and that the failure to signal learning achievements to employers is at the root of the
American learning deficit. Section 3 examines the consequences for incentives to learn and
the soning of workers to jobs (both its efficiency and distributional ramifications) of the
signals that employers base their hiring selections on. Section 4 sets fonh a series of
policy recommendations designed to improve student incentives to devote time and energy
to learning and to strengthen parental incentives to demand that local schools be upgraded.
I. APATHY: THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE LEARNING DEFICIT
American high school students do poorly in these international comparisons
primarily because they devote a lot less time and energy to the task of learning. American
students average nearly 20 absences a year; Japanese students only 3 a year (Berlin and
Sum 1988). School years are longer in Europe and Japan. Fony-five percent of Japanese
junior high school students attend Juku, private schools which provide tutoring in academic
subjects (Leestma 1987). Thomas Rohlen has estimated that Japanese high school
graduates average the equivalent of four more years in a classroom and studying than
American graduates.
Studies of time use and time-on-task show that American students actively engage
in a learning activity for only about half the time they are in high school. A study of
schools in Chicago found that public schools with high-achieving students averaged about
75 % of class time for actual instruction; for schools with low achieving students, the
average was 51 % of class time (Frederick, 1977). Other studies have found that for
reading and math instruction the average engagement rate is about 75 % (Fischer et al.,
1978; Goodlad, 1983; Klein, Tyle, and Wright, 1979;). Overall, Frederick, Walberg and
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Rasher (1979) estimated 46.5 percent of the potential learning time was lost due to
absence, lateness, and inattention.
In the High School and Beyond Survey students reponed spending an average of
3.5 hours per week on homework. When homework is added to engaged time at school,
the total time devoted to study, instruction, and practice is only 18-22 hours per week --
between 15 and 20 % of the student's waking hours during the school year. By way of
comparison, the typical senior spent 10 hours per week in a part-time job and about 24
hours per week watching television (A. C. Neilsen unpublished data). Thus, TV occupies
as much time as learning. Students in other nations spend much less time watching TV:
60% less in Switzerland and 44% less in Canada (Organization of Economic Cooperation
and Development, Table 18.1, 1986). Japanese 5th graders spend 32.6 hours a week
involved in academic activities while American youngsters devote only 19.6 hours to their
studies (Stevenson, Lee and Stigler 1986). Science and mathematics deficits are
panicularly severe because most students do not take rigorous college preparatory courses
in these subjects. The high school graduating class of 1982 took an average of only .43
credits of Algebra II, .31 credits of more advanced mathematics courses, .40 credits of
chemistry and .19 credits of physics (Meyer 1988 Table A.2).
Even more imponant than the time devoted to learning is the intensity of the
student's involvement in the process. At the completion of his study of American high
schools, Theodore Sizer (1984) characterized students as, "All too often docile, compliant,
and without initiative.(p. 54)" John Goodlad (1983) described: "a general picture of
considerable passivity among students...(p. 113)". The high school teachers surveyed by
Goodlad ranked "lack of student interest" and "lack of parental interest" as the two most
important problems in education.
The student's lack of interest makes it difficult for teachers to be demanding.
Sizer's description of Ms. Shiffe's class, illus tes what sometimes happens:
Even while the names of living thin s poured out of Shiffe's lecture, no one was
taking notes. She wanted the students to know these names. They did not want to
know them and were not going to learn them. Apparently no outside threat--
flunking, for example--affected the s dents. Shiffe did her thing, the students
chattered on, even in the presence 0 a visitor Their common front of uninterest
probably made examinations moot. hiffe could not flunk them all, and, if their
performance was uniformly shoddy, she would have to pass them all. Her
desperation was as obvious as the stu ents cruelty toward her. "(p. 157-158)
How does a teacher avoid this treatment?
provides one example.
Sizer's description of Mr. Brody's class
He signaled to the students what the minima, the few questions for a test, were; all
tenth and eleventh-graders could master these with absurdly little difficulty. The
youngsters picked up the signal and kept their part of the bargain by being friendly
and orderly. They did not push Brody, and he did not push them. The classroom
was tranquil and bland. By my watch, over a third of the time was spent on
matters other than history, and two-thirds of the classes ostensibly devoted to the
subject were undemanding. Brody and his class had agreement, all right, agreement
that reduced the efforts of both students and teacher to an irreducible and pathetic
minimum.(p. 156)
Some teachers are able to overcome the obstacles and induce their students to
undertake tough learning tasks. But for most, the student's lassitude is demoralizing.
Everyone in the system recognizes the problem, but each group fixes blame on someone
else. As one of my students put it:
As it stands now, there is an unending, ever increasing cyclic problem. Teacher
and administrator disinterest, apathy, and their lack of dedication results in students
becoming even more unmotivated and docile, which in turn allows teachers to be
less interested and dedicated. If students don't care, why should teachers? If
teachers don't care, why should the students? (Krista, 1987)
Yes, it is a classic chicken versus egg problem. Teachers are assigned responsibility for
setting high standards but we do not give them any of the tools that might be effective for
inducing student observance of the academic goals of the classroom. They finally must
rely on the force of their own personalities. All too often teachers compromise academic
demands because the bulk of the class sees no need to accept them as reasonable and
legitimate.
The Apathy of Parents and School Boards
The second major reason for the low levels of achievement by American students is
parental and school board apathy. Japanese families allocate 10 percent of the family's
income to educational expenses; American families only 2 percent. If American parents
were truly dissatisfied with the performance of their local public schools, they would send
their children to tuition financed schools offering an enriched and rigorous curriculum and
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tutoring after school would be as common as it is in Japan. Most parents who send their
children to private schools appear to be attracted by their stricter discipline and religious
education not more rigorous academics and better qualified teachers. 1 Private school
students do not learn at an appreciably faster rate than public school students (Cain and
Goldberger 1983).
A comparative study of primary education in Taiwan, Japan and United States found
that even though American children were learning substantially less in schooL American
parents were the most satisfied with the performance of their local schools (Stevenson, Lee
and Stigler, 1986). Clearly American parents hold their children and schools to lower
academic standards than Japanese and Taiwanese--as well as European--parents.
II. INCENTIVES: THE REAL CAUSE OF THE LEARNING DEFICIT
Incentives for Effort and Learning in High School
The fundamental cause of student and parental apathy is the absence of good signals
of effort and learning in high school and a consequent lack of rewards for effort and
learning. Signals of learning like years of schooling are handsomely rewarded. In 1985
25 to 34 year old male (female) college graduates working full time full year earned 38
(40) percent more than comparable high school graduates and high school graduates earned
23 (16) percent more than high school dropouts. These rewards have significant effects on
student enrollment decisions. When the payoff to a college degree for white males fell in
the early 1970s, the college attendance rates of white males fell substantially (Freeman
1976b). When the payoff to college rose again during the late 1970s and 1980s, male
college attendance rates rose as well. Years of schooling is only a partial measure of
learning accomplishment, however.
In contrast to years spent in school, the effort devoted to learning in high school
and the actual competencies developed in high school are generally not well signaled to
colleges and employers. Consequently, while students are generously rewarded for staying
in school, most students realize few benefits from working hard while in school. The lack
of incentives for effort and learning accomplishment is a consequence of three phenomena:
* The labor market fails to reward effort and achievement in high school.
* The peer group actively discourages academic effort.
6
* Admission to selective colleges is not based on an absolute or external standard of
achievement in high school subjects. It is based instead on aptitude tests which do
not assess the high school curriculum and on such measures of student performance
as class rank and grade point averages, which are defined relative to classmates'
performances not relative to an external standard.
2.1 The Absence of Major Economic Rewards for Effort in Hi~h School
Students who plan to look for a job immediately after high school typically spend
less time on their studies than those who plan to attend college. In large part, most see
very little connection between how much they learn and their future success in the labor
market. Less than a quarter of 10th graders believe that geometry, trigonometry, biology,
chemistry and physics are needed to qualify for their fIrst choice occupation (Longitudinal
Survey of American Youth 1988). Statistical studies of the youth labor market confIrm
their skepticism about the benefits of taking tough courses and studying hard:
0 Employers rank "reading, writing, math and reasoning ability" number 5 on a list of
6 abilities they look for when hiring (Survey of the National Federation of
Independent Business [NFIB] membershipf
0 For students seeking part-time employment while attending high school, grades and
performance on academic achievement/aptitude tests have essentially no impact on
labor market success. They have -
no effect on the chances of fInding work when one is seeking it during high
school, and
no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained while in high school
(Hotchkiss, Bishop & Gardner, 1982).
0 As one can see in table 1, for those who do not go to college full-time, high school
grades and test scores had -
no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained immediately after high school
in Kang and Bishop's (1984) analysis of High School and Beyond seniors
and only a 1 to 4.7 % increase in wages per standard deviation
improvement in test scores and grade point average in Meyer's (1982)
analysis of Class of 1972 data.
a moderate effect on wage rates and earnings after 4 or 5 years [Gardner
(1982) found an effect of 4.8 % per standard deviation of achievement and
Meyer (1982) found an effect of 4.3 to 6.0 % per standard deviation of
achievement],
a small negative effect on the risk of unemployment immediately after high
school.
[Figure 5 and 6 about here]
7
Date Percent Change
of Achievement in Wage Rate
Study and Data Set Graduation Age Measures Male Female
Wage Rates
Kang & Bishop (1985) 1980 19 Test-Math,Voc,Read -1.9 -.5
High School & Beyond GPA in Grade 12 .& 2.2
Gardner (1983) 197&-1982 19-24 AFQT 4.8 4.8
NLS Youth
Daymont & Rumberger 197&-1979 19-21 GPA in Grade 9 .3 2.7
NLS Youth (1982)
Meyer (1982) 1972 19 Class Rank Grade 12 0.0 2.5
(Weekly earnings) Test Composite 1.2 2.2
Class of 1972
Earnings
Hause (1975) 19&1 19 IQ,Test-Math -3.7
Project Talent (white) 23 IQ,Test-Math &.1
L-
~.-
--
Table 1
Effect of Academic Achievement
~n the Wage Rates of High School Graduates
The table reports the percentage response of the wage rate or earnings to a one
standard deviation improvement in a measure of academic achievement. For high
school seniors a one standard deviation differential on an achievement test is
about equal to 3.5 grade level equivalents or 110 points on the Verbal SAT. For
GPA, one standard deviation is about .7 when CIs = 2.0, BIS = 3.0 and Als = 4.0.
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0 Results of an analysis of the Youth Cohon of the National Longitudinal Survey are
summarized in figures 5 and 6 (Bishop, 1988). It was found that during the fIrst 8
years after leaving high school. young men received no rewards from the labor
market for developing competence in science. language ans and mathematical
reasoning. The only competencies that were rewarded were speed in doing simple
computations (something that calculators do better than people) and technical
competence (knowledge of mechanical principles, electronics, automobiles and shop
tools). For the non-college bound female, there were both wage rate and earnings
benefIts to learning advanced mathematics but no benefIts to developing competence
in science or the technical arena. Competence in language ans did not raise wage
rates but it did reduce the incidence of unemployment. The payoff to science,
language ans and mathematical reasoning competency was higher for female college
graduates than for female high school graduates. For both males and females, age
increased the payoff to computational speed but had no effect on the payoff to the
verbal, scientifIc and mathematical reasoning competencies.
The long delay before labor market rewards are received is imponant because most
teenagers are shon sighted and liquidity constrained, so benefIts promised for 10 years in
the future may have little influence on their decisions.
Although the economic benefits of higher achievement to the employee are quite
modest and do not appear until long after graduation, the benefits to the employer (and
therefore, to national production) are immediately realized in higher productivity. Over the
last 80 years, industrial psychologists have conducted hundreds of studies, involving
hundreds of thousands of workers, on the relationship between productivity in panicular
jobs and various predictors of that productivity. They have found that scores on tests
measuring competence in reading, mathematics, science and problem solving are strongly
related to productivity in almost all of the civilian jobs studied3(Ghiselli 1973; Hunter and
Hunter 1983). Studies conducted by the military similarly find that scientifIc, technical and
mathematical reasoning competencies have large effects on both paper and pencil measures
of job knowledge and hands-on measures of job performance (Hunter, Crosson and
Friedman 1985; Bishop 1988b).
Figure 7 compares the percentage effect of mathematical and verbal achievement
(specifIcally a difference of three grade level equivalents in test scores or .7 GPA points
(on a 4 point scale) on the productivity of a clerical worker, on wages of male clerical
workers (Taubman & Wales, 1975), and on the wages of young women who have not gone
to college (Kang & Bishop, 1984; Meyer, 1982). Productivity clearly increases much more
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than wage rates.4 Apparently, when a non-college-bound student works hard in school and
improves his or her competence in language arts, science and mathematical reasoning, the
youth's employer reaps much of the benefit. The youth is more likely to find a job, but
not one with an appreciably higher wage.
(Figure 7 about here)
Reasons for the Discrepancy between Wage Rates
and Productivity on the Job
Why doesn't competition between employers result in much higher wages for those
who achieve more in high school? The lack of objective information available to
employers on applicant accomplishments, skills, and productivity explains much. Tests are
available for measuring competency in reading, writing, mathematics, science, and problem
solving, but EEOC guidelines resulted in a drastic reduction in their use after 1971. A
1987 survey of a stratified random sample of small-and medium-sized employers who were
members of the National Federation of Independent Business [NFIB] found that aptitude
test scores had been obtained in only 2.9 % of the hiring decisions studied.
Other potential sources of information on effort and achievement in high school are
transcripts and referrals from teachers who know the applicant. Both are under-used. In
the NFIB survey, transcripts had been obtained prior to the selection decision for only 14.2
% of the high school graduates hired. If a student or graduate has given written
permission for a transcript to be sent to an employer, the Buckley amendment obligates the
school to respond. Many high schools are not, however, responding to such requests. The
experience of Nationwide Insurance, headquartered in Columbus Ohio, is probably
representative. The company obtains permission to get high school records from all young
people who interview for a job. It sent over 1,200 signed requests to high schools in 1982
and received only 93 responses. The company reported that colleges were more
responsive. Most high schools have apparently designed their systems for responding to
requests for transcripts around the needs of college-bound students rather than the students
who seek jobs immediately after graduating.
There is an additional barrier to the use of high school transcripts in selecting new
employees--when high schools do respond, it takes a great deal of time. For Nationwide
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Insurance the response almost invariably took more than 2 weeks. Given this time lag, if
employers required transcripts prior to making hiring selections, a job offer could not be
made until a month or so after an application had been received. Most jobs are filled
much more rapidly than that.
The only infonnation about school experiences requested by most employers is years
of schooling, diplomas and certificates obtained, and area of specialization. Only 15
percent of the NFIB employers asked applicants with 12 years of schooling to report their
grade point average. The lack of questions about school perfonnance on the job
application does not reflect an employer belief that school perfonnance is a poor predicator
of job perfonnance. When employers have grade point average infonn,ation it has a major
effect on the ratings employers assign to job applicants in policy capturing experiments
(Hollenbeck and Smith, 1984). The absence of questions about grades from most job
applications probably reflects the low reliability of self reported data, the difficulties of
verifying it, and the fear of EEO challenges to such questions.
Hiring on the basis of recommendations by high school teachers is also uncommon.
In the NFIB survey, when a high school graduate was hired, the new hire had been
referred or recommended by vocational teachers only in 5.2 % of the cases and referred by
someone else in the high school in only 2.7 %.
Clearly, hiring selections and starting wage rates often do not reflect the
competencies and abilities students have developed in school. Instead, hiring decisions are
based on observable characteristics (such as years of schooling and field of study) that
serve as signals for the competencies the employer cannot observe directly. A study of
how individual wage rates varied with initial job perfonnance found that when people hired
for the same or very similar jobs are compared, someone who is 20 % more productive
than average is typically paid only 1.6 % more. After a year at a firm, better producers
received only a 4% higher wage at nonunion firms with about 20 employees, and they had
no wage advantage at unionized establishments with more than 100 employees or at
nonunion establishments with more than 400 employees (Bishop, 1987a).
Employers have good reasons for not varying the wage rates of their employees in
proportion to their perceived job performance. All feasible measures of individual
productivity are unreliable and unstable. In most cases measurement must be subjective.
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Workers are risk averse and reluctant to accept jobs in which the judgement of one
supervisor can result in a large wage decline in the second year on the job (Hashimoto and
Yu 1980; Stiglitz 1974). Most productivity differentials are specific to the firm, and this
reduces the risk that not paying a particularly productive worker a comparably higher
salary will result in him going elsewhere (Bishop, 1987a), Pay that is highly contingent on
performance can also weaken cooperation and generate incentives to sabotage others
(Lazear 1986). Finally, in unionized settings, the union's opposition to merit pay will
often be decisive.
Despite their higher productivity, young workers who have achieved in high school
do not receive appreciably higher wage rates after high school. The student who works
hard must wait many years to reap rewards, and even then the magnitude of the wage and
earnings effect--a 1 to 2 % increase in earnings per grade level equivalent on achievement
tests--is hardly much oLan incentive. It is considerably smaller than the actual gain in
productivity that results.
2.2 The Zero-Sum Nature of Academic Competition in Hi~h School
The second root cause of high school students' poor motivation is peer pressure
against studying hard. The primary reason for peer pressure against studying is that
pursuing academic success forces students into a zero-sum competition with their
classmates. Their achievement is not being measured against an absolute, external
standard. In contrast to scout merit badges, for example, where recognition is given for
achieving a fixed standard of competence, the schools' measures of achievement assess
performance relative to fellow students through grades and class rank. When students try
hard to excel, they set themselves apart, cause rivalries and may make things worse for
friends. When we set up a zero sum competition among close friends. we should not be
surprised when they decide not to compete. All work groups have ways of sanctioning
"rate busters." High school students call them "brain geeks," "grade grubbers," and "brown
nosers. "
Young people are not lazy. In their jobs after school and on the football field, they
work very hard. In these environments they are part of a tei''TI where individual efforts are
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visible and appreciated by teammates. Competition and rivalry are not absent, but they are
offset by shared goals, shared successes and external measures of achievement (Le. satisfied
customers or winning the game). On the sports field, there is no greater sin than giving
up, even when the score is hopelessly one sided. On the job, tasks not done by one
worker will generally have to be completed by another. In too many high schools, when it
comes to academics, a student's success is purely personal.
The second reason for peer norms against studying is that most students perceive
the chance of receiving recognition for an academic achievement to be so slim they have
given up trying. At most high school awards ceremonies, the academic recognition goes to
only a few--those at the very top of the class. By 9th grade, most students are already so
far behind the leaders, that they know they have no chance of being perceived as
academically successful. Their reaction is often to dismiss the students who take learning
seriously and to honor other forms of achievement--athletics, dating, holding their liquor,
and being "cool"--which offer them better chances of success.
2.3 Incentives to Upgrade Local Schools
The lack of external standards for judging academic achievement and the resulting
zero sum nature of academic competition in the school also influences parents, school
boards, and local school administrators. Parents can see that setting higher academic
standards or hiring better teachers will not on average improve their child's rank in class
or GPA. And raising standards at their daughter's high school will have only minor
effects on how she does on the SAT, so why worry about standards? In any case, doing
well on the SAT matters only for those who aspire to attend a selective college. Most
students plan to attend open entry public colleges which admit all high school graduates
from the state with the requisite courses. Scholarships are awarded on the basis of
financial need, not academic merit.
The parents of children not planning to go to college have an even weaker incentive
to demand high standards at the local high school. They believe that what counts in the
labor market is getting the diploma, not learning algebra. They can see that learning more
will be of only modest benefi to their child's future, and that higher standards might put
12
at risk what is really imponant--the diploma.
Only when educational outcomes are aggregated, at the state or national levels, do the
real costs of mediocre schools become apparent. The whole community loses because the
work force is less efficient, and it becomes difficult to attract new industry.
Competitiveness deteriorates and the nation's standard of living declines. This is precisely
why employers, governors, and state legislatures have been the energizing force of school
reform. State governments, however, are far removed from the classroom, and the
instruments available to them for inducing improvements in quality and standards are
limited.
The number of academic courses required for graduation has been increased but
research shows that learning gains in math, science, social studies and English are a
function of the rigor not the number of courses taken (Bishop 1985). States do not have
effective control of the standards and expectations that prevail in the classroom. Even in
New York State where state administered examinations give the Board of Regents a great
deal of power over what is taught, taking Regents courses is voluntary and the use of
Regents exam scores as grades is at the option of the teacher and the local school board.
State aid can be increased but econometric studies of local school expenditures
suggest that only a ponion of such increases result in permanent increases in local school
spending. The rest ends up slowing the rate of increase of property taxes.
A consensus appears to have emerged that the first wave of top down reforms had
only modest effects and that a new wave of bottom up reform "empowering" teachers and
principals is required. A local superintendent admitted to me, however, that with out the
pressure from the state he was doubtful anything would be done. Reformers are hoping
that the publication of comparative data on student performance in different school districts
and the threat of state takeover of local school districts will spur principals, teachers and
local school boards to upgrade the schools. While publishing performance data has a
positive effect, the practice is already wide spread and cannot be expected to produce
further major improvements in standards and outcomes. In our system all the really
important decisions--budget allocations, hiring selections, salary levels, homework
assignments, teaching strategies, grading standards, course offerings, pupil assignments to
courses and programs, disciplinary policies, etc. --are made by classroom teachers and
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school adminisn-ators who are responding to local political pressures. If the parents voting
in school board elections, do not believe that a more rigorous math and science cuniculum
will help their children get a better job or into the college of their choice, state mandates
designed to raise standards in these courses will have no lasting effect.
2.4 Incentives to Learn in Other Nations
The tendency not to reward effort and learning in high school appears to be a
peculiarly American phenomenon. Marks in school are the major determinant of who gets
the most prefelTed apprenticeships in Germany. In Canada, Ausn-alia, Japan, and Europe,
educational systems administer achievement exams which are closely tied to the cuniculum.
Performance on these exams is the primary determinant of admission to a university and to
a field of study. Job applications, at all levels, require information about exam grades. In
Ireland, for example, secondary school graduates applying for clerical and blue collar jobs
put their final examination grades on their resumes (see Exhibit 1 and 2). Good grades on
the toughest exams--physics, chemistry, advanced mathematics--carry particular weight with
employers and universities.
In Japan, clerical, service and blue collar jobs at the best firms are available only to
those who are recommended by their high schooL The most prestigious firms have long
term aITangements with particular high schools to which they delegate the responsibility of
selecting the new hire(s) for the firm. The criteria by which the high school is to make its
selection is, by mutual agreement, grades and exam results. In addition, most employers
administer their own battery of selection tests prior to hiring. The number of graduates
that a high school is able to place in this way depends on its reputation and the company's
past experience with graduates from the schooL Schools know that they must be forthright
in their recommendations because if they fail just once to make an honest recommendation,
the relationship will be lost and their students will no longer be able to get jobs at that
firm (Rosenbaum and Kariya 1987).
Parents in these countries know that a child's future depends critically on how much
is learned in secondary schooL In many countries the options for upper secondary
schooling depend primarily on the child's performance in lower secondary school, not on
where the parents can afford to live as in the US. Since the reputation of the high school
14
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is so imponant, the competitive pressure often reaches down into junior high school.
National exams are the yardstick, so achievement tends to be measured relative to everyone
else's in the nation and not just relative to the child's classmates. As a result, parents in
most other Western nations demand more and get more from their local schools than we
do and yet, nevenheless, are more dissatisfied with their schools than American parents.
Japanese adolescents work extremely hard in high school, but this changes once they
enter college. For most students, a country club atmosphere prevails. The reason for the
change in behavior is that employers apparently care only about which university the youth
attends, not about the individual's academic achievement at the university. Studying very
hard is not a national character trait. it is a response to the way Japanese society rewards
academic achievement.
American students, in contrast, take it easy in high school but generally work
substantially harder in college. This change is in part caused by the fact that when higher
level jobs requiring a bachelors or associates degree are being filled, employers pay more
attention to grades and teacher recommendations than when they hire high school
graduates. The NFIB survey found that when college graduates were hired, 26.5 percent of
the employers had reviewed the college transcript before making the selection, 7.8 percent
had obtained a recommendation from a major professor and 6.3 percent had obtained a
recommendation from a professor outside of the graduate's major or from the colleges's
placement office.
ITI. EMPLOYER SELECTION CRITERIA:
IS THERE A TRADEOFF BETWEEN SORTING EFFICIENCY
AND INCENTIVES TO LEARN?
The lack of true engagement in learning and the apathy of local political systems
regarding the quality of local schools is to an imponant degree a consequence of the
failure of employers to reward students for real learning achievements. The solution is for
employers (particularly those with attractive jobs) to use of academic achievement as an
important selection criterion when hiring recent high school graduates. Academic
achievement is not directly observable, however, so employers must base their decisions on
imperfect signals of true achievement. The incentive effects of employer hiring behavior
depend on which signals they choose to use. The sorting of workers to jobs will also
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depend on this choice. Thus the choice of a signal of academic achievement has efficiency
and distributional effects as well as incentive effects and these effects need to be examined.
In panicular we must investigate whether there is a tradeoff between the goal of generating
incentives to learn and the efficient sorting of workers to jobs?
The distributional consequences of making academic achievement a more imponant
factor in hiring selections are not difficult to project The beneficiaries will be women
generally, those attending schools that have good teachers and maintain high standards and
those who study hard in school. The losers will be men, blacks, Hispanics, those attending
poor schools and those not putting much effon into their studies. Adverse impacts on
blacks and Hispanics can be avoided by race/ethnicity norming the test scores (as the
GATB currently does) and affirmative action. Consequently, impacts on minority groups
should not be the basis for deciding whether to select workers on the basis of academic
achievement (or what measures of academic achievement to use). Other instruments are
available for achieving societal goals regarding integration on the job. When, however, it
comes to generating incentives to develop the skills needed on the job and efficient
matching of workers to jobs, there appears to be no other selection instrument that will son
efficiently while generating the correct incentives quite as well as measures of academic
achievement will. These are the two criteria by which alternative employee selection
policies should be evaluated. That is the task undenaken in this section of the paper.
Soning efficiency will tend to be maximized when separate competencies are
measured and employers select workers with the panicular combination of competencies
that are needed in its jobs. In other words, effon should be made to maximize differential
validity. Measures of academic achievement should be used but they should supplement
not displace consideration of occupationally relevant training and experience. If most of
the people hired into an entry job move up to other more responsible positions, the criteria
applied at the pon of entry needs to take the higher level jobs into account.
The analysis presented in the first pan of the paper implies that student incentives
to learn and parental incentives to demand a quality education are maximized when the
following is true: (1) significant economic rewards depend directly and visibly on academic
accomplishments, (2) the accomplishment is defmed relative to an externally imposed
standard of achievement and not relative to one's classmates, (3) the reward is received
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quickly, (4) everyone, including those who begin high school with senous academic
deficiencies, has an achievable goal which will generate a significant reward and (5)
progress toward the goal can be monitored by the student, parents and teachers.
We will see shortly that it is not easy to design a system of signaling and certifying
academic achievement which satisfies all of these requirements. Consequently, it will
generally be desireable to use more than one signal of academic achievement and to use
different signals when selecting for different jobs. Let us examine the alternatives.
Diplomas:
High school diplomas and college degrees are effective devices for generating
incentives to enroll in school. The standard diploma does not, however, generate incentives
to attend regularly or to study hard. Establishing a minimum competency level for
receiving a high school diploma only slightly improves incentives. Some students arrive in
high school so far behind and the consequences of not getting a diploma are so severe,
minimum competency standard are not set very high (and cannot in good conscience be set
too high given the constraints on the system). Once they satisfy the minimum, many
students stop putting effort into their academic courses.
Schooling is a valid predictor of job perfonnance but to a great degree its validity
derives from its correlation with test scores. The evidence on its incremental contribution
to validity once test scores are controlled is more mixed. An analysis of GATB
revalidation data by Bishop (1987b) found very weak effects of schooling but this is
probably an artifact of the selection biases (Mueser and Maloney 1988). Selection into the
military is based explicitly on the test scores and high school graduation, not on
unobservables as in the civilian sector. Since selection is based on X variables, selection
effects can be corrected for (Dunbar and Linn 1986). Analysis of military data finds that
high school graduation has its own unique impacts when test scores are controlled.
Weiss's (1985) study of Western Electric employees found that completing high school is a
valid predictor of low absenteeism and low turnover but not job perfonnance. Thus even
when studies find that graduating from high school has little effect on job perfonnance, it
appears to effect retention. Consequently, from a sorting efficiency point of view, the high
school diploma belongs on the list of credentials considered by employers even when test
17
scores are available.
-
Competency Proftles:
Competency proftles are check lists of competencies that a student has developed
through study and practice. The ratings of competence that appear on a competency
profile are relative to an absolute standard, not relative to other students in the class. By
evaluating students against an absolute standard, the competency profile prevents one
student's effon from negatively affecting the grades received by other students. It
encourages students to share their knowledge and teach each other.
A second advantage of the competency profile approach to evaluation is that
students can see their progress as new skills are learned and checked off. The skills not
yet checked off are the learning goals for the future.
Seeing such a check list getting filled up is inherently reinforcing.
With a competency profile system, goals can be tailored to the student's interests
and capabilities, and progress toward these goals can be monitored and rewarded. Students
who have difficulty in their required academic subjects can, nevenheless, take pride in the
occupational competencies that they are developing and which are now recognized just as
prominently as course grades in academic subjects. Upon graduation, the competency
profile would be encased in plastic and serve as a credential cenifying occupational
competencies. If the ratings by teachers (and the sponsoring employers of cooperative
education students) are reliable indicators of competence, employers will find this
information very valuable, and the students who build a good record will be handsomely
rewarded.
Hiring Based on Grades in High School:
Using grades to select new hires results in a very visible dependence of labor
market outcomes on an indicator of academic accomplishment. There are, however, two
disadvantages. It results in zero-sum competition between classmates and consequently
contributes to peer pressure against studying and parental apathy about the quality of
teaching and the rigor of the curriculum. The second problem is that it induces students to
select easy courses and thus tends to cause grade inflation. These problems can be
mitigated somewhat if employers take the rigor of courses into account when evaluating
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grades, give preference to schools with tough grading standards, and vary the number hired
from panicular schools in response to the actual job performance of past hires from that
school. From the sorting point of view, the disadvantage of high school GPA is that it has
low validity when there are no adjustments made for grading standards and it is difficult
for employers to make such adjustments.s
Job Tryout and Promotions Based on Performance:
From the point of view of motivating students to study, the problem with job tryout
and performance reward systems is that the dependence of labor market outcomes on
academic achievements is both invisible and considerably delayed.
From the efficiency point of view, the disadvantages of job tryout are the costs of
training workers who end up being fired, its unpopularity with workers who will spend
months unemployed if they are fired, and its potential for generating grievances.
Performance evaluations are known to be unreliable, and this makes workers reluctant to
take jobs in which next year's pay is highly contingent on one supervisor's opinion. Pay
that is highly contingent on performance can also weaken cooperation and generate
incentives to sabotage others. The benefits of performance reward systems are that they
motivate better performance, they tend to attract high performers to the firm, and they tend
to induce the high performers to stay at the firm. When these factors are balanced, it
appears that most workers and employers choose compensation schemes in which
differentials in relative productivity result in relatively small wage differentials (Bishop
1987a).
Job Knowledge Tests:
From the point of view of learning incentives, the disadvantage of job knowledge
tests is that they do not generate incentives to study math, science, history and literature
and may induce students to over-specialize in school. If at some point in their career a
job in the field for which they prepared is not available, they are left high and dry.
From the point of view of sorting efficiency, job knowledge tests have much to
recommend them for they maximize differential validity. They are particularly appropriate
if applicants vary in their knowledge and background in the occupation and training costs
are substantial. If new hires are likely to be quickly promoted into higher level jobs, the
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job knowledge test should also cover the skills required in these jobs. Job knowledge tests
are less useful when none of the applicants has experience in the field and training costs
are low.
IQ Tests:
Students, parents and teachers view IQ tests as measuring something that schools do
not teach. Even though this public perception is not entirely correct, the perception is not
likely to change in the near future, so hiring on the basis of IQ tests fails requirement # 1.
Students will not see the connection between how hard they study and higher IQ scores.
General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB):
The cognitive subtests of the current GATB measure only a limited number of very
basic skills--vocabulary, reading, arithmetic computation and reasoning. There are no sub-
tests measuring achievement in most of the subjects in the standard high school curriculum-
-science, social science, algebra, high school geometry or trigonometry. Greater use of the
GATB to make hiring selections would strengthen incentives to learn arithmetic and
English but would not strengthen incentives to study other high school subjects.
Consequently, hiring on the basis of the GATB fails requirement # 1.
On the other hand, a large body of research suggests that the cognitive subtests of
the GATB are valid predictors of job performance in many private sector jobs (Hunter
1983). This research implies that it is in the private interest of individual companies to
use these tests for selection. The social benefit of greater test use depends on whether the
abilities measured by the tests have larger impacts on worker productivity in dollars in
some occupations than in others and whether greater test use would improve the allocation
of workers across occupations and jobs. Since the cognitive competencies measured by the
GATB do have significantly larger payoffs in plant operator, technical and craft jobs than
in operative, service and sales clerk jobs (Hunter 1983; Hunter, Schmidt and Judiesch
1988; Bishop 1988a), reassigning workers who do well on a test to occupations where the
payoff to the talent is particularly high will increase aggregate output. Bishop (1988a) has
estimated the magnitude of the output effect by reweighting the 31,399 individuals in the
GATB revalidation data to be representative of the 71 million workers in the non-
professional and non-managerial occupations and then simulating a resoning of workers.
Reassigning workers on the basis of occupational work experience and three GATB
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composites--basic mathematical and verbal skills, perceptual speed and psychomotor ability-
- raises total output by 6.9 percent of labor compensation, all but eliminates gender
segregation in the work place and substantially improves the wage levels of jobs held by
women but has adverse impacts on blacks and Hispanics. As discussed in the paper, the
simulation probably overstates the effect of greater test use so the true effect is more likely
to be about 2 or 3 percent of compensation or between $60 and $90 billion per year.
Thus, the sorting benefits of greater use of the GATB in selection decisions are quite
substantial. We will see shortly, however, that other selection methods--broad spectrum
achievement tests and achievement exams assessing the student's mastery of the high
school cuITiculum--are able to achieve at least as efficient sorting outcomes as the GATB
and generate much better incentive effects.
Broad Spectrum Achievement Tests:
From the point of view of incentives to study a broad range of academic subjects,
broad spectrum achievement tests such as the ASVAB are the best of the alternatives
reviewed so far. If some of the subtests in the battery include material covered in the
standard college prep high school cuITiculum such as algebra, statistics, chemistry, physics
and computers, the use of such tests for selection would generate parental pressure for an
upgraded curriculum and encourage high school students to take more rigorous courses.
When many employers use achievement tests to select new employees, everyone who wants
a good job faces a strong incentive to study, and those not planning to go to college will
find the incentive especially strong. The best paying firms will find they can set higher
test score cutoffs than low paying firms, so the reward for learning will become
continuous. Whether one begins 9th grade way behind or way ahead, there will be a
benefit on the margin to studying hard for it will improve one's job prospects.
Broad spectrum achievement tests covering science, computers, mechanical
principles, economics, business practices and technology as well as mathematics, reading
and vocabulary also maximize soning benefits as welL Test batteries which cover the full
spectrum of knowledge and skills taught in high school are more valid predictors of job
performance than tests which assess math and verbal skills only. Evidence for this
statement comes from examining the relative contributions of various subtests to the total
validity of the ASVAB battery. Maier and Grafton's (1981) analysis of the job
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perfonnance SQTs of Marine Corps recruits found, for example, that validity (corrected for
restriction of range) was .46 for auto shop infonnation, .50 for mechanical comprehension,
.51 for electronics infonnation, .51 for general science, .50 for word knowledge, .52 for
mathematics knowledge, and .51 for arithmetic reasoning. Tests measuring electronics,
mechanical, automotive and shop knowledge--material that is generally studied only in
vocational courses--have high validity. Analyzing this and other military data sets, Hunter,
Crosson and Friedman (1985) concluded that the "general cognitive ability" construct that
best predicted perfonnance in all military jobs included subtests in .general science,
electronics infonnation, mechanical comprehension and mathematics knowledge as well as
conventional word knowledge and arithmetic reasoning subtests. The addition of these four
subtests to the construct increased validity by 11 percent and the proportion of true job
perfonnance variance explained in the Maier and Grafton data from .306 to .372 (Hunter,
Crosson and Friedman, 1985, Table 19).
Broad spectrum achievement test batteries also improve differential validity. The
technical subtests of ASVAB are important predictors of SQTs in technical and
maintenance jobs but did not contribute to the prediction of perfonnance in clerical jobs.
Verbal subtests contributed to clerical perfonnance but did not correlate with perfonnance
10 many of the other jobs in the study. Tests measuring understanding of statistics,
business, economics, marketing and psychology would probably similarly improve the
validity of batteries used to select workers for most white collar jobs in the private sector.
The conclusion that follows from this analysis is that, on both sorting and incentive
grounds, broad spectrum achievement test batteries are preferable devices for selecting
workers than the cognitive subtests of the GATB.
Perfonnance on Achievement Exams Taken at the End of Secondary School
In Canada, Australia, Japan and most European countries, the educational system
administers achievement test batteries (eg. the '0' and 'A' Levels in the UK, the
Baccalaureate in France) which are closely tied to the curriculum. These are not minimum
competency exams. Excellence is recognized as well as competence. In France, for
example, students who pass the Baccalaureate may receive a "Tres Bien", a "Bien", an
"Assez Bien" or just a plain pass. Most job applications request infonnation on which
exams were taken and what scores were obtained on each exam. These exams generate
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credentials which signal academic achievement to all employers and not just the employers
who choose to give employment tests. The connection between one's effort in school and
performance on these exams is clearly visible to all. Consequently, school sponsored
achievement exams like those used in Europe would have much stronger incentive effects
than employer administered broad spectrum achievement tests.
This approach to signaling academic achievement has a number of advantages.
Because it is centralized and students take the exam only once, job applicants do not have
to take a different exam at each firm they apply to and the quality and comprehensiveness
of the test can be much greater. There is no need for multiple versions of the same test
and it is much easier to keep the test secure. By retaining control of exam content,
educators and the public influence the kinds of academic achievement that are rewarded by
the labor market. Societal decisions regarding the curriculum (eg. all students should read
Shakespeare's plays and understand the Constitution) tend to be reinforced by employer
hiring decisions. Tests developed solely for employee selection purposes would probably
place less emphasis on Shakespeare and the Constitution.
The disadvantages of schools administering the achievement exams is that students
have fewer chances to demonstrate their competence. If one has an off day, one must
typically wait many months before the exam can be retaken. With employer administered
exams, having an off day is less damaging for one will shortly have a chance to do better
at another employer. Employers may also find it is easier to compare job applicants who
have all taken the same employer administered exam.
With regard to validity, there is probably little to choose between the two systems.
Separate scores are reported for each subject so employers may focus on the tests which
have special relevance to their jobs. School administered tests are more reliable measures
of achievement because they sample a much larger portion of the student's knowledge of
the field (the ASVAB General Science subtest, by contrast, allows the student 11 minutes
to do 24 items). They may also be more valid because they are not limited to the
multiple choice format. Thus, even though the topics covered in the school exam are
probably less relevant to the firm's jobs, the school exam is probably just as valid a
predictor of job performance as a specially designed employment test.
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The key to motivation is recognizing and rewarding learning effort and achievement.
Individual learning goals should be established which challenge the student to the
maximum extent possible and achievement of these goals should be recognized at a school
awards ceremony and communicated to the labor market. If employers know who has
learned, they will provide the rewards. There must be significant rewards for learning and
real consequences for failing to learn. Learning accomplishments need to be described on
an absolute scale so that improvements in the quality and rigor of the teaching and greater
effort by all students makes everybody better off.
Some might respond to this strategy for achieving excellence by stating a preference
for intrinsic over extrinsic motivation of learning. This, however, is a false dichotomy.
Nowhere else in our society do we expect people to devote thousands of hours to a
difficult task while receiving only intrinsic rewards. Public recognition of achievement and
the symbolic and material rewards received by achievers are important generators of
intrinsic motivation. They are, In fact, one of the central ways a culture symbolically
transmits and promotes its values. The policy recommendations have been grouped into
four categories: school sponsored signals of academic achievement made available to
employers, reforming college admissions criteria, greater use of more valid broad based
achievement tests for selecting workers and more powerful school administered incentives
for academic achievement.
4.1 Improvin~ Measures of Academic Achievement
so the Labor Market will Reward Effort in Hi~h School
The first best solution to the incentives problem is for the educational system to
take on the job of deciding what academic and vocational competencies are to be measured
and how they are to be signaled to employers. Schools should provide graduates with
certificates or diplomas that certify the students' knowledge and competencies, not just their
attendance. Competencies should be defined relative to an absolute standard in the way
Scout merit badges are. Different types of competency need to be distinguished and
different levels of competency signaled.
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Instituting Statewide Achievement Examinations
States should adopt statewide tests of competency and knowledge that are specific to
the cmriculum being taught (e.g. New York State's Regents Examinations) and then give
students a competency profile certifying performance on each of these exams which could
be used as an aid in searching for jobs. State merit based scholarships should be awarded
on the basis of student performance on these achievement exams. Such examinations
would offer several benefits.
0 Better inform students and parents about how well the student is doing and
thus help parents work with teachers to improve their children's performance.
0 Make the relationship between teachers and students more cooperative, with
the teacher and students working jointly to prepare the students for the exam.
0 Strengthen student incentives to learn because merit based scholarships are
based on them and because competence in specific subjects would be
effectively signaled to parents, employers and colleges.
0 Create a database that school boards and parents could use to evaluate the
quality of education being provided by their local schoo1.
0 Enable employers to use scores on these examinations to help improve their
selection of new employees. If the uncenainties involved in hiring are
reduced, expanding employment will become more profitable, total
employment will increase, and recent high school graduates will be better
able to compete with more experienced workers.
Local Competency Profiles
Another way to motivate students is to give them feedback on their
accomplishments through the mechanism of a criterion referenced competency profile.
Competency profiles are check lists of competencies that are the goals of instruction. The
ratings of competence that appear on a competency profile are relative to an absolute
standard, not relative to their classmates. By evaluating students against an absolute
standard, the competency profile avoids a negative feedback of one students effon into
another student's grade. It encourages students to share their knowledge and teach each
other.
A second advantage of the competency profile approach to evaluation is that
students can see their progress as new skills are learned and checked off. The skills not
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yet checked off are the learning goals for the future. Seeing such a check list get filled up
is inherently reinforcing.
With a competency profIle system, goals can be tailored to the student's interests
and capabilities, and progress toward these goals can be monitored and rewarded.
Vocational educators have found that competency profiles greatly enhance the effectiveness
of competency based vocational education. The approach is just as applicable to academic
courses as it is to vocational courses. Upon graduation, the competency profile would be
encased in plastic, given to the student, and serve as a credential certifying both generic
and occupational competencies.
Graduation Credentials ("Career Passpon". "Competency Profile") which Signal the
Student's Accomplishments in High School.
The coverage and format of the document should probably be worked out
cooperatively by a committee that includes school administrators, employers and other
interested parties. Developing and using such a document might be a part of a campaign
to enlist commitments from major local employers to hire students as interns (during the
summer) and new graduates. Compactness and standardization is desireable in order to
make it easier for employers to use information in their hiring decisions. Employers
should be encouraged to ask to see the ponfolio and make a copy of it to attach to the
application.
Releasing Student Records
The school can help students provide employers with information by developing an
equitable and efficient policy for releasing student records. While developing this policy,
school officials should keep in mind their dual responsibilities of protecting the student's
right to privacy and helping students find a good, suitable job. The student and his or her
parents should receive copies (encased in plastic) of transcripts and other records that might
be released so that they may make them available to anyone they choose.
Schools can develop a form that would explain to parents and students their rights,
as well as the pros and cons of disclosing information. The Buckley Amendment requires
that the form specify the purpose of disclosure, which records are to be released, and who
is to receive the records. The law allows the student to specify a "class of patties." The
class specified could be "all potential employers contacted by the student," which would
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cut down on the paper work needed. Once the student has filed a request, the school is
required by law to comply. Schools can best serve students by handling all inquiries
expeditiously and without charge.
4.2 Reform Colle2e Admission Policies
Promote Advanced Placement Courses
The Advanced Placement program is a cooperative educational endeavor which
offers course descriptions, examinations and sets of curricular materials in 28 different
academic subjects. Students who take these courses and pass the examinations may receive
college credit for high school work. Expanding and upgrading the AP program should be
a center piece of any effort to promote excellence in American secondary education. It
clearly meets a felt need for it is growing rapidly. The numbers of students taking AP
exams more than doubled between 1983 and 1988. Nevertheless, only 8022 of the 22,902
US high schools participate in the Advanced Placement Program and only 52 AP exams
are taken on average in each participating high schooL In 1988 only 6.6 percent of the
seniors and 3.3 percent of the juniors took an AP exam (The College Board 1988). The
nation should set a goal of doubling these percentages by 1991 and quadrupling them by
1995. Acting in concert, the college presidents of the 200 most selective colleges in the
nation should send a letter to the every high school principal in the country (with copy to
the school board and local newspaper) urging them to create an AP program or expand the
one they have. They should also announce that starting in 1993, students seeking
admission to their school should have taken and passed at least one AP course in junior
year and be taking more than one AP course their senior year.6 Students coming with AP
credit should be placed in more advanced courses and as soon as possible these more
advanced courses should become the normal starting point for college freshman who intend
to concentrate in the field.
The federal government can facilitate the growth of the AP program by financing
summer institutes for the teachers of AP courses and by offering a $100. AP Excellence
Award (larger if the student is eligible for Pell Grant aid) to every student who gets an
"eligible for college credit" score on the exam and $150. award for getting a top score.
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To insure that attending a summer institute is considered a plum, compensation should be
generous. In 1988 approximately 42,000 teachers taught AP courses. Rapid expansion of
the program will require a yearly increase of 8000 in the stock of teachers teaching AP
courses and if half of the increment to the stock were to experience summer institute
training for 6 weeks, the cost would be about 28 million dollars. In 1988 286,009
students would have been eligible for an AP excellence award so the program would have
cost under 40 million dollars. The purpose of the AP Excellence Award is to honor
excellence and encourage students to take AP courses and only secondarily to aid in the
finance of higher education. If a good deal of publicity were attached to these awards,
they would have major symbolic effects.
Induce Colleges to Drop the SAT and ACT Tests from their selection criteria and
substitute scores on AP and Regents type exams which cover the curriculum taught in High
School
While national tests are necessary, the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is not the
kind of test that is helpful. The SAT suffers from two very serious limitations: the
limited range of the achievements that are evaluated and its multiple choice format. The
test was designed to be curriculum free. To the extent that it evaluates the students'
understanding of material taught in schools, the material it covers is vocabulary and
elementary and junior high mathematics. Most of the college preparatory subjects studied
in high school--science, social studies, technology, art, music, computers, trigonometry and
statistics--are completely absent from the test. As a result, it fails to generate incentives
to take the more demanding courses or to study hard. The multiple choice format is also a
severe limitation. National and provincial exams in Europe are predominantly essay and
extended answer examinations. The absence of essays on the SAT and ACT tests
contribute to the poor writing skills of American students. The test advertises itself as an
ability test but is in fact an achievement test measuring a very limited range of
achievements (Jencks and Crouse 1982). Jencks and Crouse have recommended that either
the SAT evaluate a much broader range of achievements or be dropped in favor of AP
examinations. Knowledge and understanding of literature, history, technology and science
and higher order thinking skills should all be assessed. These exams should not be limited
to a multiple choice format and essays should be required where appropriate. Foreign
language exams, for example, should test conversational skills as well as reading and
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writing. Students taking science courses should be expected to conduct experiments and
demonstrate the use of lab equipment.
Promote the Development of New Assessment Mechanisms
Linking assessment to the curriculum requires a greater diversity of assessment
mechanisms. States should not be prevented from having their own unique curriculum
simply because examinations keyed to this curriculum are not available. However, the
need for multiple versions and for fairness to minorities make test development very
expensive. The federal government should underwrite state consortia and other
organizations that seek to develop alternatives to currently available tests and assessment
mechanisms. Priority needs to go to developing methods of assessing higher order thinking
skills and competencies that cannot be evaluated using a multiple choice format.
While testing organizations would publish and oversee grading of the exams, the
subjects covered by the exam and the skills tested would be selected by a committee of
teachers and specialists in the field. Examples of groups that might sponsor and direct test
development are the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, associations of private
colleges, state boards of education, and textbook publishers. There should be a conscious
effort to maximize philosophical and educational diversity in the selection of consortia for
funding. The push for better measures of student learning should not be limited to the
academic arena. A similar effort should be made in the vocational area. Consideration
should be given to federal subsidies of the administration cost of more costly assessment
mechanisms such as essays, judged portfolios, hands-on performance tests and simulations
designed to measure higher order thinking skills.
4.3 Greater Use of Improved Employment Tests
If states do not adopt a credentialing system based on statewide achievement
testing, employer testing must be allowed so that the labor market will reward effort
and learning in high school.
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Add Subtests Measuring Technical. Scientific and Advanced Mathematical Competency to
the General Aptitude Test Battery
The Employment Service's program of validity research for the GATB has made
this test one of the few employment tests whose validity (as a predictor of job
performance) has been generalized for a great variety of jobs. The content of the GATB
was set in the 1940's and there has been little change in the content of the academic
subtests since then. The nature of jobs has changed substantially and it is time to rethink
the content of the GATB. The ASVAB research discussed earlier indicates that validity
would be substantially increased by adding subtests measuring technical, scientific and
advanced mathematical knowledge and skills. The Department of Labor should
immediately add subtests similar to the technical, mathematical knowledge and science
subtests of the ASV AB to the GATB and include these subtests in the composites that are
used for recommending clients to civilian jobs that are similar to the jobs studied in the
military. The employment service should also undertake a major study of the validity of
the new GATB in the full spectrum of civilian jobs.
The fear of litigation has significantly inhibited testing research outside of
government. Companies no longer share the results of their validity studies or allow them
to be published (even when the company's name is withheld) for fear of revealing their
defense strategy to a potential litigant. As a result, research on tests other than the GATB
has been inhibited. The government needs to step into the vacuum it has created and
sponsor a major increase in research into the development and validation of improved
employment tests.
EEOC Regulations Should Encourage the Use of Broad Spectrum Achievement Test
Batteries rather than IQ Tests and the Current GATB
EEOC regulations and case law have in the past required that a very expensIve
validation study be conducted before a firm can use any test to help select employees
(Friedman and Williams 1982). The result has been to greatly diminish the use of tests for
employee selection and to substantially reduce the rewards for learning. Sandra Day
O'Conner's concurring opinion in the Watson case appears to open the door for increased
use of employment tests (McDowell and Dodge 1988). It appears that employers will be
able to justify the use of employment tests without having to undertake costly validity
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studies in their own finn by citing validity research done for similar jobs in other firms.
Since civilian research on test validity has used the GATB almost exclusively, there is a
very real danger that most fIrms will choose to use reading, vocabulary, and arithmetic
reasoning tests that are demonstrably similar to their GATB counterparts. Unfortunately,
the verbal and mathematical subtests of the GATB are considerably less valid than tests
measuring a broader range of competencies and do not generate incentives for students to
study history, algebra, trigonometry, and science.
Courts have in the past required that employers demonstrate that each question on
an employment test has a specifIc application in each job for which it is a proposed
selection device. To avoid having to redesign tests for each job, test developers are likely
to dumb the test down and include only simple questions covering mathematical, scientifIc
and technical principles that are learned in grade school. Litigation costs and the potential
liability are enormous so companies have become extremely cautious about testing. When
selecting a test, defensibility in court has become a much more important criterion than
maximum validity. Given the uncertainty of whether ASVAB research will be accepted as
evidence on the validity of similar tests for civilian jobs, broad spectrum achievement test
batteries will probably be judged too risky. A well designed validity study can protect a
firm using an unconventional test battery but in most cases the potential benefIt of fInding
a more valid selection method will not outweigh the costs of the study and the greater
risks of litigation. If things are left as they are, it will be at minimum a decade before
tests measuring competence in algebra, science and the technical arena can be used as
general selection devices for craft and other blue collar jobs. Firms need to be given a
signal by the EEOC that broad spectrum achievement tests are acceptable selection devices
and in fact preferred over the low level basic skills test that serves as the' g' aptitude of
the GATB.
For employment tests to generate incentives to learn, students, parents and teachers
must be aware that local employers are using tests for selection and what kind of material
is included on these tests. Unfortunately, the fear of litigation has caused many employers
to give only limited publicity to their use of tests. This is another reason why employers
need to be told by people in authority that they are acting in the national interest when
they seek out and reward those who have high level academic skills.
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The Federal Government Should give Greater Weight to Academic Achievement in its own
Hiring
The federal government is the largest employer in the country. It should set an
example for the private sector by announcing that hence forth it is giving greater weight to
academic achievement in high school and college than it has in the past.
The military currently admits recruits into the military on the basis of AFQT scores
and the high school diploma. The current AFQT is an average of scores on the verbal,
arithmetic reasoning and mathematical knowledge subtests of the ASV AB. By adding the
general science, electronics knowledge, mechanical comprehension and the auto/shop
knowledge tests to the composite which defines the AFQT, the military would
simultaneously increase the validity of their selection and improve incentives to study
science and technical subjects in high school.
The Office of Personnel Management is designing a biodata form to be used for
selecting professional and managerial personnel for the federal government. The current
draft of the form asks applicants a number of questions about the grades in high school
and college and about class rank. It does not ask about the difficulty level of the courses
taken (Office of Personnel Management, 1987). Current plans are to request that
transcripts be sent only for a sample of the applicants and to use this data only for
checking the accuracy of the information provided. If discrepancys are discovered for
people who were hired, the cases will be referred to investigators. The questions are
worded in such a way, however, that only the most outrageous of distortions can be proved
to be a lie and therefore are grounds for dismissal. The following changes in civil service
hiring procedures are recommended:
0 All candidates for civil service jobs (including clerical jobs) should be required to
send their high school and college transcripts.
0 After a preliminary screening on the basis of the biodata key, course grades and
difficulty level indicators should be coded for the most recent school attended.
0 Final rankings should be based on a combination of the transcript information,
biodata scores on job relevant tests and other relevant information.
This change will increase hiring costs but the benefits of greater validity and improved
incentives outweigh these costs by a large margin.
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4.1 School Based Rewards for Learnin~
Cooperative Learning
One effective way of inducing peers to value learning and support effort in school
is to reward the group for the individual learning of its members. This is the approach
taken in cooperative learning. Research results (Slavin 1985) suggest that the two key
ingredients for successful cooperative learning are as follows:
0 A cooperative incentive structure--awards based on group performance--seems
to be essential for students working in groups to learn better.
0 A system of individual accountability in which everyone's maximum effort
must be essential to the group's success and the effort and performance of
each group member must be clearly visible to his or her group mates.
For example, students might be grouped into evenly matched teams of 4 or 5 members that
are heterogeneous in ability. After the teacher presents new material, the team works
together on work sheets to prepare each other for periodic quizzes. The team's score is an
average of the scores of team members, and high team scores are recognized in a class
newsletter or through group certificates of achievement.
What seems to happen in cooperative learning is that the team develops an identity
of its own, and group norms arise that are different from the norms that hold sway in the
student's other classes. The group's identity arises from the extensive personal interaction
among group members in the context of working toward a shared goal. Since the group is
small and the interaction intense, the effort and success of each team member is known to
other teammates. Such knowledge allows the group to reward each team member for his
or her contribution to the team goal, and this is what seems to happen.
Turn Schools into All Day Learning Centers
Schools should remain open after the end of the regular school day and a full range
of remedial and enrichment programs and extra curricular activities and interscholastic
sports should be offered.
Keep the Schools Open During the Summer
Longitudinal studies of learning have found that the pace of learning slows
considerably during the summer and that disadvantaged students especially lose ground
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during the summer months (Heyns 1987). Experimental evaluations of STEP, a program
for disadvantaged youth that combines a part time summer job with about 90 hours of
remediation, has found that adding the remediation to the summer job results in gains in
academic achievement of .5 grade level equivalents (Corporation for Public Private
Ventures 1988). It would appear that summer programs targeted on educationally and
economically disadvantaged children are likely to have high payoffs.
A Massive Dose of Mastery Learning
Students who are not learning at the desired rate should be required to commit
additional time to the task after school and during the summer. At the beginning of the
school year school personnel would meet with the student and his or her parents to set
goals. Students who are not perfonning at grade level in core subjects and who do not
make nonnal progress during the school year should be kept after school for tutoring and
remedial instruction and required to attend summer school. Assessments of progress should
be made at appropriate points during the school year to infonn students of their progress
and to enable those who are participating in remedial programs after school to demonstrate
they are now progressing satisfactorily. Course grades and teacher evaluations would be a
central part of the assessment process, but there should be an external yardstick as well.
The external yardstick might be a competency check list, a mastery test keyed to the
textbook, or an exam specified by the state, the school or collectively by the teachers in
the that grade level or department. The reason for the external yardstick is that it helps
insure that students perceive the standard to be absolute rather than relative to others in the
class, and it helps create a communality of interest between teacher and student. Teachers
need to be perceived as helping the student achieve the student's goals not as judges
meting out punishment. Since students will want to avoid being required to get remedial
instruction after school and during the summer, this will be a powerful incentive for them
to devote themselves to their studies.
Honoring Academic Achievement
Schools should strengthen their awards and honors system for academic and non-
academic accomplishments. The medals, trophies, and school letters awarded in
interscholastic athletics are a powerful motivator of achievement on the playing field.
Academic pursuits need a similar system of reinforcement. Public school systems in Tulsa
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and a number of other cities have started awarding school letters for academic
achievements. Awards and honors systems should be designed so that almost every student
can receive at least one award or honor before graduation if he or she makes the effort.
Outstanding academic performance (e.g., high grades or high test scores) would not have to
be the only way of defining excellence. Awards could be given for significant
improvements in academic performance since the previous year or since the beginning of
the school year, for public service in or out of school, for perfect attendance records, and
for student of the week (criteria could vary weekly). The standard for making an award
should be criterion referenced: if greater numbers achieve the standard of excellence, more
awards should be given.
A prominent place in the school should be reserved for bulletin boards where
pictures of the most recent winners and reasons for their receiving recognition could be
posted. Another form of recognition could be displays of student work: art, science, social
studies, vocational education projects, and so forth. Periodically, the parents of the most
recent award winners and sponsoring teachers should be invited to an evening assembly at
which time the principal would award the students the certificate or plaque recognizing
their accomplishments.
4.5 Summary
The key to motivation is recognizing and rewarding learning effort and achievement.
Employers should start demanding high school transcripts and give academic achievement
(particularly achievement in math and science) much greater weight when hiring. Business
and industry should communicate this policy to schools, parents, and students. High school
graduates should not be relegated to sales clerk jobs simply because of their age. Like
their peers in Europe, Canada, and Japan, they should be allowed to compete for really
attractive jobs on the basis of the knowledge and skills they have gained in high school.
Schools should reduce the disincentives to studying. Cooperative learning such as
Student Teams-Achievement Divisions would encourage the peer group to reward learning
effort by having students study in small heterogeneous groups and structuring competition
to be between evenly matched teams and rather than unevenly matched individuals (Slavin,
1983). Criterion referenced competency profiles should be available for students,
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describing and cenifying academic, vocational, anistic and extra-curricular accomplishments.
Frequent awards ceremonies should recognize individual effort to attain learning goals, so
that every student who works hard is recognized sometime in the school year. Those
seeking work will be able to use their grades as well as competency profIles and awards as
aids in securing employment.
Although the problems are less dramatic for the college-bound, parallel effons
should be made to increase incentives for them. College counselors and admission officers
should deemphasize SATs, rank in class and OPA and substitute criterion-referenced
systems of assessment such as AP exams in which the student is not engaged in zero sum
competition with classmates. Although paper and pencil achievement tests tied to the
state's curriculum should be part of this assessment, the measures of achievement available
must be broadened to include accomplishments such as essay writing, conversing in a
foreign language, conducting laboratory experiments, playing an instrument, repairing a car,
and so forth.
Institutional arrangements of schools and the labor market have profound effects on
the incentives faced by students, teachers, parents and school administrators. The passivity
and inattention of students, the low morale of teachers, the defeat of so many school levys
and low rankings on international measures of achievement are all logical outcomes of
institutional arrangements which weaken student incentives to study and parental incentives
to fund a high quality education. Only with an effective system of rewards within schools
and in the labor market can we hope to overcome the pervasive apathy and achieve
excellence.
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NOTES
1. At the post secondary level, university reputations are based on the rigor of the
program and students compete for the right to pay $15,000 a year to attend and
study for long hours. Competition is keen for admission to selective universities
because a degree from one of these colleges is handsomely rewarded by the labor
market (Solomon 1975; Wise 1978). Comparably rigorous private secondary schools
have a much smaller share of their market. The reason for their small market share
is that they provide only modest help in the competition for admission to the best
colleges. The early curriculum specific college admissions tests were abolished in
favor of aptitude tests partly to reduce the advantage that students at private high
schools had under the old system. Attending such schools probably has little effect
on SAT scores and almost certainly results in a lower OPA.
2. The survey was of a stratified random sample of the NFIB membership. Larger
firms had a significantly higher probability of being selected for the study. The
response rate to the mail survey was 20 percent and the number of usable
responses was 2014.
3. These tests measure the competencies that are the prime objectives of schooling.
School attendance has been shown to improve performance on these tests (Lorge,
1945). Between World War I and World War II, the average IQ test scores of
literate white army draftees increased by 11 points (Bishop 1989).
4. Studies that measure output for different workers in the same job at the same firm,
using physical output as a criterion, have found that the standard deviation of output
varies with job complexity and averages about .164 in routine clerical jobs and .278
in clerical jobs with decision making responsibilities (Hunter, Schmidt & Judiesch
1988). Because there are fixed costs to employing an individual (facilities,
equipment, light, heat and overhead functions such as hiring and payrolling), the
coefficient of variation of marginal products of individuals is assumed to be 1.5
times the coefficient of variation of productivity. Because about 2/3rds of clerical
jobs can be classified as routine, the coefficient of variation of marginal productivity
for clerical jobs is 30 % [1.5*(.33*.278+.67*.164)]. A .5 validity for general mental
ability then implies that an academic achievement differential between two
individuals of one standard deviation (in a distribution of high school graduates) is
associated with a productivity differential in the job of about 11 % (.5*.74*30%).
The ratio of the high school graduate test score standard deviation to the population
standard deviation is assumed to be .74. This issue is more thoroughly discussed in
Bishop (1987b).
5. Most of the published studies of the validity of grades probably used information
that had been collected by the firm when hiring decisions were being made.
Consequently, most of the validity coefficients reported for grades are probably
negatively biased by the selection effects so the true validity of OPA than is
generally thought.
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6. This proposal sounds radical but, in fact, is only a modest change from current
practice at these selective colleges. A survey of college placement officials
conducted by USA Today and interviews of officials at Cornell and SUNY
Binghamton conducted for this repon found that students were expected to take AP
courses if they are offered and grade point averages were adjusted for the difficulty
level of the courses taken. High school students and parents are generally unaware
of this policy, however, and many have not factored it into their high school course
selections. The announcement, therefore, has two effects: it informs students and
parents of existing admissions policies and warns that come 1993 those seeking
admission to selective colleges will not necessarily be held harmless if a local high
school does not offer AP courses. This announcement will generate strong political
pressure on principals and school boards to expand their AP program and allow
additional students to take AP courses. Students at schools not offering AP might
be offered other ways of demonstrating college level proficiency such as an AP
independent study option, taking courses during the summer at a local college or
high scores on the afternoon subject matter SAT exams or New York State Regents
exams. Exceptions would have to be made for students from under represented
minorities, foreign students and in other individual cases but exceptions should not
become the rule.
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